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Glass v. Stahl Specialty Company: Reconciling
Third Party's Contribution Rights with
Employer's Immunity under Workers'
Compensation
Courts and legislatures nationwide have consistently failed
to reconcile the conflict between the workers' compensation
employer immunity provision and a third party's right of contri-
bution. This conflict intensified in Washington when the Legis-
lature enacted the Tort Reform and Product Liability Act' con-
taining a provision establishing a right of contribution among
jointly and severally liable tortfeasors2 Faced with the overlap
between the new law and workers' compensation, the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, in Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co.,s held that
an employer's immunity from tort actions brought by its
employees 4 prohibits contribution by an employer who is jointly
1. WASH. REV. CODE chs. 4.22 and 7.72 (1981) (enacted as Act of April 17, 1981, ch.
27, 1981 Wash. Laws 112) [hereinafter cited as the Act]; see generally Talmadge, Wash-
ington's Product Liability Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1981) (general discussion of
the history and underlying principles of the Act).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040 (1981). The statute provides in pertinent part:
A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are
jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury,
death or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or any
of them. It may be enforced either in the original action or by a separate action
brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution among liable persons is
the comparative fault of each such person. However, the court may determine
that two or more persons are to be treated as a single person for purposes of
contribution.
Id.
3. 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652 P.2d 948 (1982).
4. Similar to workers' compensation laws in other states, Washington's Industrial
Insurance Act removes actions by employees against employers from the tort system and
immunizes the employer from all such claims.
WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1981), the codification of Washington's industrial
insurance law, provides:
The State of Washington. . . declares that all phases of the premises are with-
drawn from private controversy and sure and certain relief for workers is
hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every
other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in
this title; and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such
personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes
are hereby abolished, except as in this title provided.
Id.
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and severally liable. Although the Glass court decision is consis-
tent with the majority view, its reaffirmation of the no contribu-
tion rule fails to consider the tension between the policies and
interests. Consequently, the Glass decision perpetuates a rule
that forces a third party tortfeasor sued by an injured employee
to shoulder the entire liability regardless of the employer's fault.
This note argues that the correct resolution of the tension
between the employer's immunity and the third party's right of
contribution requires balancing the interests of all parties. The
employer has an interest in retaining the workers' compensation
law's exclusive no-fault recovery system;5 the third party
tortfeasor seeks to avoid shouldering the entire liability of
another at-fault tortfeasor capable of contribution. At the same
time, the employee has a right to full and speedy compensation,
and the state has an interest in maintaining the financial stabil-
ity of its accident fund.' This note explores the policies and legal
arguments supporting the majority view of no contribution and
the minority views of full and partial contribution and concludes
that, contrary to the opinion of many courts, these interests can
be balanced and the tort and workers' compensation systems
reconciled by allowing a limited form of contribution.
Because Washington courts have failed to resolve the con-
flict between the workers' compensation system and the doctrine
of contribution, this note suggests that the legislature should
amend Washington's workers' compensation law. The Industrial
Insurance Department's lien and subrogation rights should be
limited when the employer is at fault.8 If the employee has been
In addition, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.010 (1981) provides:
Each worker injured in the course of his or her employment, or his or her fam-
ily or dependents in case of death of the worker, shall receive compensation in
accordance with this chapter, and, except as in this title otherwise provided,
such payment shall be in lieu of any and all rights of action whatsoever against
any person whomsoever.
Id.
5. Washington's exclusive remedy provision is included in WASH. REV. CODE §§
51.04.010, 51.32.010 (1981). For the text of these statutes, see supra note 4.
6. Unlike most other jurisdictions, Washington does not allow an employer to use
private insurance coverage for workers' compensation. An employer must be covered by
the state fund or be an authorized self insurer under WASH. REV. CODE § 51.14.020
(1981).
7. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.08.040 (1981). The statute provides that "department"
means Department of Labor and Industries.
8. Washington's current Industrial Insurance Act provides the insurer with subroga-
tion rights, WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.050 (1981), and lien rights, WASH. ,REv. CODE §
51.24.060 (1981). This means that if an injured employee elects to sue a third party
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compensated by workers' compensaton, his judgment against the
third party tortfeasor should be diminished by this amount, or
the amount calculated from the employer's percentage of fault,
whichever is less, with the Department retaining a lien on the
difference between the percentage of fault and the amount of
compensation paid. If no payment has been made or future pay-
ments are available, the third party tortfeasor should pay the
employee in full and be assigned the employee's compensation
rights. In addition, employers' premiums should be modified and
base rates increased to reflect their cost experience. Although
these revisions will place heavier burdens on the employers than
workers' compensation currently imposes, these changes recon-
cile the tort and workers' compensation systems by distributing
the burdens of workplace injuries in an equitable, efficient and
balanced fashion.
I. THE CASE
James Glass's right hand was injured by an aluminum die
case molding machine, manufactured by Stahl Specialty Com-
pany (Stahl). At the time of his injury, Glass was operating the
machine in the course and scope of his employment with Morel
Foundry Corporation (Morel). After receiving workers' compen-
sation benefits, Glass brought a products liability action against
Stahl alleging negligence and strict liability as theories of recov-
ery. Stahl then impleaded Morel on a theory of contribution
under the 1981 contribution statute." Morel's motion for dismis-
whose negligence was a proximate cause of his workplace injury, the insurer, if he has
paid compensation, has a lien against any judgment. Hence, if a jury awarded an injured
employee a $100,000 judgment against the third party the third party would be required,
under joint and several liability, to pay plaintiff $100,000. Upon payment plaintiff would
be allowed to pay costs and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff would then receive 25% of the bal-
ance. The insurer would then be reimbursed from the subsequent balance the amount he
had paid in compensation to the employee. The employee would then receive the
remainder. If, however, following receipt of compensation the employee elects not to sue
the third party the insurer will be assigned the employee's rights against the third party.
The insurer may then prosecute or compromise in the name of the employee. Upon
receiving judgment the insurer subtracts its costs of litigation and compensation paid to
the employee and the balance goes to the employee.
It should be noted that self insurers also have lien and subrogation rights. WASH.
REV. CODE § 51.24.050 (1981). This note does not directly address the implications to self
insurers if limited contribution were to be allowed. For additional discussion of the pos-
sible impact on self insurers, see infra note 113.
9. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040 (1981). For the text of the statute, see supra note 2.
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sal was denied, but on appeal,10 the Washington Supreme Court
held that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss Morel from
the case. The court found that the new contribution statute does
not apply when the joint tortfeasor is an employer.
Adhering to the view taken prior to the passage of the con-
tribution statute,1 the court reasoned that the Industrial Insur-
ance Act 2 had abolished judicial jurisdiction over civil actions
for personal injuries between employers and employees. 3 There-
fore, the court proscribed impleading of employers under the
new contribution statute as a device to permit the court to
"assume jurisdiction over this immunized area of tort law."' 4
The court found that the contribution statute, creating a right of
contribution only when two or more persons are jointly and sev-
erally liable 5 to a single plaintiff, did not change existing law
pertaining to employers. Under the Industrial Insurance Act,
when an employee is injured on the job, the employer is immune
from suit by the employee.'" Therefore, the court reasoned that
the requisite joint and several liability is missing. Without joint
and several liability a right of contribution cannot arise. In addi-
tion, the court determined that sound principles of statutory
construction and the legislative history of the Tort Reform and
Products Liability Act contradicted any argument that the legis-
lature intended to alter existing case law.' 7
10. Because the trial court's order stated that its judgment was final, Morel
appealed directly to the supreme court. The supreme court, however, found that the
order was not final with respect to any one claim or party and thus could not be a final
judgment under WASH. R. CIVIL P. 54 (b), but because of the importance of the issue, the
supreme court granted discretionary review under WASH. R. APP. P. 2.2, 2.3 (b), 5.1.
Glass, 97 Wash. 2d at 882, 883, 652 P.2d at 949, 950.
11. See, e.g., Redford v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d 1285 (1980);
Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308
(1980).
12. The workers' compensation act in Washington is an industrial insurance statute,
WASH. REV. CODE tit. 51 (1981), under which the remedy for claims is made against a
fund in the hands of a state commission and not against the employer. Stertz v. Indus.
Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 594, 158 P. 256, 259 (1916).
13. See Thompson v. Lewis County, 92 Wash. 2d 204, 208, 595 P.2d 541, 543 (1979).
See also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.010, 51.32.010 (1981), and supra note 4 for the text
of these statutes.
14. Glass, 97 Wash. 2d at 885, 652 P.2d at 951.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040 (1981). For the text of the statute, see supra note 2.
16. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.04.010 (1981).
17. Glass, 97 Wash. 2d at 887, 888, 652 P.2d at 952. The court stated that in con-
struing a statute it assumes that the legislature is familiar with past judicial interpreta-
tions of its enactments. Unless the legislature indicates its intention to overrule the com-
mon law, new legislation will be presumed to be in accord with prior judicial decisions in
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Although Glass comports with the majority view,18 the deci-
sion fails to penetrate the overlapping legislative schemes to
reach the underlying issues. The court acknowledged the unfair-
ness of saddling one wrongdoer with all the damages when the
other wrongdoer is an employer but nevertheless refused to
weigh the public policy implications that result, preferring to
leave the issue to the legislature. Concededly, the legislature
may be in a better position to harmonize the two statutory
schemes,/ but the court's summary dismissal of policy consider-
ations leaves little to guide future application of the new right of
contribution statute. Thus, the court unnecessarily perpetuates
the unfair no contribution rule without illuminating the purpose
and policies underlying the rule. The way other courts have
dealt with this issue can provide helpful analysis in evaluating
the Washington court's decision. It is important, however, to
review the policies that underlie the rule.
II. ANALYSIS OF POLICIES
Workers' compensation is a no-fault system 2 designed to
overcome the hardships imposed by the common law upon an
employee who is suing his employer for a workplace injury.
Washington's workers' compensation statute is not an em-
ployer's liability act; it is an industrial insurance statute.2 The
employee looks to a fund fed by various employers rather than
a field of law. The court also relied on a committee conclusion in the WASHINGTON STATE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT AND PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM FINAL REPORT, 47th
Legis., Reg. Sess. 26, reprinted in 1 Senate Journal 617, 629, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981)
(hereinafter cited as REPORT], that changes to the workers' compensation third party
action statute should be made by the joint committee on workers' compensation. As
pointed out, however, by the chairman of the Select Committee on Tort and Product
Liability Reform, "[i]t could be argued that the act expressly adopts the fault apportion-
ment policy of contribution and thereby implicitly overrules the Industrial Insurance
Act's employer immunity, or the Act expands upon these instances where an indepen-
dent duty may be discerned by the courts." Talmadge, Washington's Product Liability
Act, 5 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rav. 1, 18 n.73 (1981).
18. Annot., 100 A.L.R. 3d 350 (1980); Annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 977 (1957). See infra
notes 36, 58 and accompanying text.
19. A discussion of the role of the court as a legislative body is beyond the scope of
this note, although it might be suggested that more judicial activism was needed than
the court displayed. For further discussion of the court's role when faced with conflicting
statutes, see infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
20. Washington's workers' compensation law provides employees with "certain relief
... regardless of questions of fault." WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.010 (1981). See supra
note 4 for a partial text of the statute.
21. Stertz v. Indus. Ins. Comm'n, 91 Wash. 588, 594, 158 P. 256, 259 (1916).
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to the employer for the scheduled mandatory compensation. An
employer cannot exempt himself from the burdens of the Act.2"
In exchange for paying premiums to the Industrial Insurance
Fund, the employer expects the fund to assume financial respon-
sibility for compensating injured workers. To create this limited
liability, employers and employees compromised.2  The
employer gave up all common law defenses and agreed to pay for
insurance that would cover all claims by the employee even
when the employer was not at fault. The employee sacrificed his
common law cause of action against the employer, accepting
compensation far below that which he might have won in court
on the assurance that he would receive the small sum without
having to fight for it.2 4 By compromising these rights, workers'
compensation provides injured workers with immediate relief
and places the burden of accidents on the industry involved
rather than on other public assistance programs. It eliminates
expensive and burdensome litigation, promotes safety in the
workplace, reduces friction between the worker and the
employer, and results in more harmonious industrial relations
than were possible previously.
25
The merit of this compromise, made 60 years ago, needs
reevaluation today. Since the introduction of workers' compen-
sation, many of the defenses given up by the employer in
exchange for immunity from litigation have also been abolished
in the tort system.2" Thus, the employer's quid pro quo has been
partially abrogated. Furthermore, one study suggests that work-
ers' compensation currently provides inadequate benefits.27
Despite these inefficiencies and inequities, however, the National
Commission on State Workers' Compensation Laws rejected a
return to civil damages.2 8 Arguably, workers' compensation still
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.04.060 (1981).
23. Stertz, 91 Wash. at 590, 158 P. at 258.
24. Id.
25. W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (2d ed. 1932). See also REPORT OF
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATON LAWS 35 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT OF NATIONAL COMMISSION).
26. WASH. Rzv. CODE § 4.22.005 (1981) (eliminating contributory fault as a complete
bar and instituting a comparative fault analysis).
27. See REPORT OF NATIONAL COMMSSION, supra note 25, at 141-46. The report esti-
mated the cost of adopting the recommendations of the national commission. These esti-
mates indicate how far below the recommended level of benefits each state is.
28. Id. at 119-20. The report indicated that from a worker's standpoint the option to
rely on negligence suits may seem more attractive than it was 50 years ago, when work-
ers' compensation was first widely adopted, because the plaintiff's burden in negligence
[Vol. 6:343
1983] Third Party's Contribution Rights 349
provides desired employee relief and employer security, but its
perceived failings suggest a need to reform and limit the system.
Its recognized benefits compel no more than preservation of its
basic structure and integrity.
In contrast to no-fault workers' compensation, tort law is a
fault system" designed to compensate an injured party for inju-
ries caused by others. The Legislature restructured Washing-
ton's tort law in 1981 by enacting the Tort Reform and Product
Liability Act.30 The basic tenet behind the Tort Reform Act (the
Act) is the creation of a fairer and more equitable apportion-
ment of liability among parties at fault.-" The purpose of the Act
suits has been eased. Other reasons, however, convinced the committee that for workers,
and others, workers' compensation is still preferable. The determination of negligence
tends to be expensive and uncertain because of the intermingling of employer-employee
negligence. Payments tend to be delayed when negligence suits are prosecuted, and over-
crowded court dockets compound the delays. Thus some workers may receive higher
damage awards but others would receive no protection. Finally, even when the worker
succeeded in winning monetary damages the litigation could be a substantial deterrent to
successful rehabilitation.
For a contrary point of view, see Ashford, Negligence v. No-Fault Liability: An
Analysis of the Workers' Compensation Example, 12 SEToN HALL 725 (1982). The
author concludes that despite approximately three-quarters of a century of public con-
cern and controversy, one cannot conclude on the basis of data generally cited to demon-
strate the superiority of workers' compensation over negligence that workers' compensa-
tion has effected an improvement in terms of wage loss compensation and deterrence
objectives over the evolving negligence system it replaced.
A thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of the workers' compensation system is
beyond the scope of this note. The assumption made without further analysis is that the
system does provide some benefits to injured workers and therefore it should not be
abolished. Its scope should be limited, however, precisely because of the system's
deficiencies.
29. Workers' compensation is granted to an employee regardless of questions of
fault. WASH. REv. CODE § 51.04.010 (1981). For partial text see supra note 4. On the
other hand, to recover from a third party, the employee must prove that his harm was
proximately caused by the negligence of the third party. This involves proving either a
products liability claim, WASH. REv. CODE § 7.72 (1981); or a common law negligence
claim. See, e.g., LaPlante v. State, 85 Wash. 2d 154, 531 P.2d 299 (1975).
30. Act, supra note 1.
31. Tort reform in this state has for the most part been accomplished in the
courts on a case-by-case basis. While this process has resulted in significant
progress and the harshness of many common law doctrines has to some extent
been ameliorated by decisional law, the legislature has from time to time felt it
necessary to intervene to bring about needed reforms such as those contained
in the 1973 comparative negligence act.
The purpose of this amendatory act is to enact further reforms in the tort
law to create a fairer and more equitable distribution of liability among parties
at fault.
Of particular concern is the area of tort law known as product liability law.
Sharply rising premiums for product liability insurance have increased the cost
of consumer and industrial goods. These increases in premiums have resulted
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was to treat the parties involved in a balanced fashion and to
distribute the costs evenly.12 The drafters of the Act concluded
that a fairer apportionment of fault in tort actions required
comparison of the relative fault of all parties to the action. The
plaintiff's recovery then would be reduced by his percentage of
fault .3  The drafters also indicated that even the differing
degrees of fault of contributory negligence and strict liability
should be compared despite the conceptual difficulties. 4 By
accepting the premise of fault comparison regardless of the
degree, the legislature established that principles of fairness and
equity should guide the tort system. In reconciling tort law with
workers' compensation, these principles underlying the tort sys-
tem should be preserved to the extent they do not invalidate
higher principles of law or overly interfere with the basic struc-
ture and integrity of workers' compensation.
The Tort Reform Act also codified the joint and several lia-
bility rule35 enunciated in Seattle-First National Bank v. Shore-
line Concrete Co. 36 As the court pointed out in Shoreline:
in disincentives to industrial innovation and the development of new products.
High product liability premiums may encourage product sellers and manufac-
turers to go without liability insurance or pass the high cost of insurance on to
the consuming public in general.
It is the intent of the legislature to treat the consuming public, the product
seller, the product manufacturer, and the product liability insurer in a bal-
anced fashion in order to deal with these problems.
It is the intent of the legislature that the right of the consumer to recover
for injuries sustained as a result of an unsafe product not be unduly impaired.
It is further the intent of the legislature that retail businesses located primarily
in the state of Washington be protected from the substantially increasing prod-
uct liability insurance costs and unwarranted exposure to product liability
litigation.
Act, supra note 1, at Preamble. See also the analysis of the Preamble in REPoiT, supra
note 17, at 27, 1 Senate Journal 629, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981).
32. Throughout the select committee's hearings, representatives of product
sellers and product liability insurers argued that the current judicially created
tort system fails to fairly allocate liability among those responsible for the
harm with the resulting additional costs passed on to the consumers in gen-
eral .... The purpose of the bill, then, is to treat the consuming public, the
product seller, the product manufacturer, and the product insurer in a bal-
anced fashion in order to deal with these problems.
REPORT, supra note 17, at 28, 1 Senate Journal 629, Reg. & Ist Ex. Sess. (1981).
33. Id. at 21, 1 Senate Journal 626, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981).
34. Id.
35. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.030 (1981). The statute provides: "If more than one
person is liable to a claimant on an indivisible claim for the same injury, death or harm,
the liability of such person shall be joint and several." Id.
36. 91 Wash. 2d 230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
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The cornerstone of tort law is the assurance of full compensa-
tion to the injured party. To attain this goal, the procedural
aspect of our rule permits the injured party to seek full recov-
ery from any one or all of such tortfeasors . . . What may be
equitable between multiple tortfeasors is an issue totally
divorced from what is fair to the injured party."7
Justification for retaining joint and several liability rests on the
superior equitable rights of the plaintiff compared with the
rights of those at fault. The plaintiff's right to full and rapid
recovery takes precedence over the tortfeasors' rights to allocate
liability among themselves in proportion to fault. The drafters
of the Tort Reform Act found this priority sufficient reason to
retain joint and several liability.3 8 Although there is disagree-
ment,3 9 the retention of joint and several liability comports with
the goal of the tort system to provide full compensation to the
injured party. Reforms, such as contribution, that treat the
tortfeasors more fairly should not result in decreasing the
chances of recovery by injured plaintiffs. 0
These policies are the tenets that underlie the structure of
the tort and workers' compensation systems. The priority placed
on these policies provides a foundation for balancing the inter-
ests of the third party, the employer, the employee, and the
state, thus establishing a guide for resolution of the issue of con-
tribution from employers.' 1 State and federal decisions from
37. Id. at 236-37, 588 P.2d at 1312-13.
38. The Senate Select Committee felt that, although the rule of joint and several
liability imposes some hardships, defendants rather than plaintiffs should bear the bur-
den of the unfairness. REPORT, supra note 17, at 23, 1 Senate Journal 627-28, Reg. & 1st
Ex. Sess. (1981). The rule of joint and several liability was also retained by the drafters
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. UNrF. COMPARATIVE FAULT AcT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 41
(Supp. 1982) (Commissioner's Comment).
39. See Note, Third Party Liability to Injured Workers under R.C. W. Title 51, 55
WASH. L. REv. 243 (1975). The author suggests several inequities resulting from the
court's decision in Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230,
588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
40. See Note, Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort
Reform Act, 57 WASH. L. REv. 479, 488 (1982).
41. This note does not discuss the possibility that a third party should be able to
seek indemnification from the employer when the employer is the primary tortfeasor.
Washington does not allow this type of implied indemnity between active and passive
tortfeasors. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1981). Active/passive indemnity was abol-
ished because it departs from the principles of comparative fault. REPORT, supra note 17,
at 51, 1 Senate Journal 636, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981). Contractual indemnity between
employers and third parties is allowed. Redford v. Seattle, 94 Wash. 2d 198, 615 P.2d
1285 (1980). See also Gordon H. Ball, Inc. v. Oregon Erecting Co., 273 Or. 179, 185, 539
P.2d 1059, 1062 (1975). For a discussion of implied indemnity between employers and
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other jurisdictions have given the policies different priorities and
suggest three different ways that the issue can be resolved. The
majority view gives preference to the workers' compensation sys-
tem and denies contribution. One minority view gives preference
to the tort system and allows full contribution. A second minor-
ity view tries to balance the policies and allows limited
contribution.
III. THE MAJORITY VIEW DENYING CONTRIBUTION
A majority of courts hold that a third party cannot bring a
statutory or common law action for contribution against an
employer.' There are several policy reasons advanced to sup-
port this view. The primary policy argument against contribu-
tion is that the workers' compensation system provides a guar-
anteed, fixed schedule, no-fault recovery system that constitutes
the exclusive liability of the employer to his employee. Allowing
contribution would force the employer to pay his employee,
through the conduit of the third party tortfeasor, an amount in
excess of his statutory workers' compensation liability, thus
thwarting the exclusive remedy concept central to workers' com-
pensation.' Opponents of contribution argue that contribution
would undermine the quid pro quo rationale of the workers'
compensation system." The Washington Supreme Court
explained this quid pro quo rationale in Stertz v. Industrial
Insurance Commission:
Our act came of a great compromise between employers and
employed. Both had suffered under the old system, the
employers by heavy judgments of which half was opposing law-
yers' booty, the workmen through the old defenses or exhaus-
tion in wasteful litigation. Both wanted peace. The master in
exchange for limited liability was willing to pay on some claims
in the future where in the past there had been no liability at
all. The servant was willing not only to give up trial by jury but
to accept far less than he had often won in court, provided he
third parties, see 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 76 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as A. LARSON].
42. A. LARSON, supra note 41, at § 76.20; Annot., 100 A.L.R. 3d 350 (1981); Annot.,
53 A.L.R. 2d (1957).
43. Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 120, 257 N.W. 2d 679, 684
(1977).
44. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 290 N.W.2d 276 (1980).
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was sure to get the small sum without having to fight for it."
It is argued that a rule allowing contribution would subject the
employer to the lengthy and costly litigation he thought he was
avoiding when he agreed to be liable regardless of fault. In addi-
tion, contribution would expose the employer to common law
liability while depriving him of the defenses of contributory neg-
ligence and assumption of risk.48 Both these outcomes, oppo-
nents argue, would create an imbalance in the compromise out-
lined in Stertz by allowing exceptions to the workers'
compensation system on the basis of irrelevant factors such as
whether the employee can find a third party to sue.
A final argument advanced against contribution is the
employer's right to a lien against any amount recovered by the
plaintiff from a third party.47 Allowing the employer to recoup
any compensation paid to the injured worker after the worker
has received full recovery from a third party not only prevents
the employee from obtaining double recovery, but also protects
the funds of the workers' compensation system from being
drained by the remiss of strangers. In essence, the opponents of
contribution argue that an employer has a primary interest in
limiting his payment for employee injury to the workers' com-
pensation schedule and a secondary interest in receiving reim-
bursement when a third party has caused him to incur obliga-
tions to his employee."8
Courts that have adopted the majority view have relied on
two legal arguments to foreclose the right of contribution. The
first is that contribution requires tortfeasors to be jointly liable.
Because workers' compensation immunizes the employer from
tort liability to his employee he cannot be jointly liable with the
third party. Consequently, there can be no right of contribu-
tion. 4" The second legal argument used by majority courts states
45. 91 Wash. 588, 590-91, 158 P. 256, 258 (1916).
46. Brown v. Dickey, 397 Pa. 454, 459, 155 A.2d 836, 838 (1959). The argument that
an employer should not be exposed to litigation without his common law defenses is not
viable in jurisdictions such as Washington where comparative fault principles have taken
the place of defenses like contributory negligence and assumption of risk. See WASH.
REv. CODE § 4.22.005 (1981).
47. Beach v. M. & N. Modern Hydraulic Press Co., 428 F. Supp. 956, 965 (D. Kan.
1977); Schweizer v. Elox Division of Colt Industries, 133 N.J. Super. 297, 336 A.2d 73
(1975).
48. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 122, 257 N.W.2d at 685.
49. Professor Larson suggests that this is the first hurdle that a third party must
overcome if he seeks contribution from an employer and, in the vast majority of cases,
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that the workers' compensation exclusivity clause,50 granting an
employer immunity from litigation, acts as a complete bar to
any suit brought against an employer for a workplace injury.5 '
These arguments granting deference to workers' compensation
fail to adequately balance all the policies and interests involved.
Most courts that follow the majority view use the argument
that an employer cannot be jointly liable.52 The decision of the
Federal District Court of Kansas in Beach v. M & N Hydraulic
Press Co., 5" is an example. The Beach court held that an
employer's liability is purely statutory and supersedes any com-
mon law liability for negligence. Since joint liability is premised
upon the common law negligence of both tortfeasors, an
employer cannot be jointly liable for purposes of contribution.
The court also held that the employer, or his insurance com-
pany, has a lien against any recovery by plaintiff from a third
party in the amount of any compensation paid to the employee
regardless of whether the employer was at fault. The reasoning
in Beach illustrates a court applying statutes without assessing
where the purposes and policies of the statutes are implicated.
The court, in effect, adopted a rule of construction giving
supremacy to the workers' compensation system without consid-
ering the possibility that the relative scope of the workers' com-
pensation and tort systems might be defined in a manner which
does not impair the values and functions underlying either
system.
A similar error was made earlier by the New Jersey Court of
Appeals in Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority." The
Farren court concluded, as had the Beach court, that workers'
compensation superseded the employee's common law redress
this hurdle acts as a bar to contribution. Larson, Workmen's Compensation: Third
Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 351, 360 (1970).
50. Washington's exclusivity clause is codified in WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.04.010,
51.32.010 (1981). For partial text of the clause see supra note 4.
51. This is the second hurdle that Professor Larson suggests must be overcome by
the third party seeking contribution from an employer. Larson, Workmen's Compensa-
tion: Third Party's Action Over Against Employer, 65 Nw. U.L. REv. 351, 360-61 (1970).
The words "against any person whomsoever" contained in WASH. REv. CODE § 51.32.010
(1981) are an example of the catchall phrase used by courts to block actions for contribu-
tion against employers. See supra note 4 for statutory text.
52. See, e.g., Myers v. J.A. McCarthy, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Armor
Elevator Co. v. Elevator Sales and Service, Inc., 360 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978).
53. 428 F. Supp. 956 (D. Kan. 1977).
54. 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (1954).
[Vol. 6:343
Third Party's Contribution Rights
against the employer, immunizing the employer from tort liabil-
ity. The court went on to state:
The impracticability of the application of the present contribu-
tion Act to the instant situation is immediately discernable.
The essence of the doctrine of contribution is the existence of a
common monetary obligation to the injured person. The joint
tortfeasor contemplated by the statute is aequali juri.5
Relying on the assumption that the two systems are incom-
patible, and that therefore no common liability exists, is a super-
ficial approach to the problem. Liability is a much broader con-
cept than the courts seem willing to recognize. While there is,
strictly speaking, no common liability to the employee in tort,
both the employer and the third party are nonetheless responsi-
ble for compensating the employee for his injuries: the employer
through the fixed no-fault workers' compensation system and
the third party through the variable recovery available in a com-
mon law tort action.50 As the drafters of the Tort Reform Act
pointed out, contribution is recognized in a majority of states as
a flexible, equitable remedy designed to accomplish a fair alloca-
tion of loss among parties at fault.57 Such a remedy should be
utilized to achieve fairness undeterred by outdated technical
concepts like common liability.58 If the courts had been willing
to accept a broader definition of liability they could have
resolved the conflict fairly and equitably by adopting a rule of
limited contribution which would have allocated the losses fairly
without thwarting the interests of the workers' compensation
system so highly regarded in Beach and Farren.
A third example of cursory analysis by a court adopting the
majority view is found in Schweizer v. Elox Division of Colt
Industries.9 In Schweizer, the third party argued for a form of
limited contribution by requesting that his liability be reduced
to the extent of the employer's liability under the workers' com-
pensation system. The Schweizer court rejected this argument
and concluded, as did the Beach court, that an employer or his
insurance carrier has an absolute lien right against any recovery
of the plaintiff from the third party in the amount that the
55. Id. at 360-62, 106 A.2d at 755.
56. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
57. REPORT, supra note 17, at 24, 1 Senate Journal 628, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981).
58. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
59. 133 N.J. Super. 297, 336 A.2d 73 (1975).
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employee has already been compensated. The third party, there-
fore, must pay in full or the employee would not be fully com-
pensated. The rationale for this rule is prevention of double
recovery by the employee. The Schweizer court, however, failed
to realize that the double recovery problem is solved by denying
the employer or insurance carrier his lien and subrogation rights
when he is a joint tortfeasor and allowing the judgment against
the third party to be diminished by the amount already paid in
compensation benefits. Nor would this solution impose any lia-
bility on an employer in excess of his liability under the workers'
compensation statute.8 0 A judgment reduction would also be
consistent with the policy, clearly enunciated by the Schweizer
court, that an employer with the blood or death of an injured
worker on his hands be barred from invoking the impartial pow-
ers and processes of the law. 1
The second legal argument is that the workers' compensa-
tion exclusivity clause immunizes the employer from all litiga-
tion. In Venters v. Michigan Gas Utilities Co.,6 2 the court held
that because the third party's claim of contribution against the
employer is derivative of the principal plaintiff's right, an
impleader action would require a finding that, with respect to
the plaintiff, the employer and third party are joint tortfeasors.
But this would violate the exclusive remedy provision of the
workers' compensation statute. Thus, an employer has no com-
mon liability and is not a joint tortfeasor.65 Acknowledging the
inequities of its ruling, the court went on to hold that the third
party may have been the secondary cause of the injury and the
employer the primary cause and therefore the third party was
entitled to have its claim for active/passive indemnity tested fac-
tually at the trial." The active/passive indemnity rule allows a
secondarily negligent tortfeasor to be indemnified by a primarily
negligent tortfeasor even though there was no indemnity con-
60. See infra text accompanying notes 105-09 for a discussion on implementing the
limited contribution rule.
61. Schweizer, 133 N.J. Super. at 302-03, 336 A.2d 73 at 76. Several courts have
found the policy of restricting a wrongdoer's access to the impartial powers of the law
persuasive and have allowed the judgment against the third party tortfeasor to be
reduced pro tanto by the amount to which the employee would be entitled under work-
ers' compensation. See, e.g., Brown v. Southern Ry. Co., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419
(1933); Maio v. Fahs, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
62. 493 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
63. Id. at 348.
64. Id. at 351.
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tract between them. The indemnification covers the whole cost
of the injury. By using indemnification concepts, the court
attempted to mitigate the harshness of the no contribution rule
with an inequitable "all or nothing" rule. 5 But merely substitut-
ing one unfair rule for another ignores the need for reconciling
the tort and workers' compensation systems.
In summary, a majority of courts deny contribution by say-
ing in one way or another that there is no joint liability. This
conclusion rests on the premise that the workers' compensation
system is paramount to the tort system. But maintaining the
interests of workers' compensation does not require that its pur-
poses be deemed superior; allowing a limited form of contribu-
tion would not be inconsistent with the basic structure of work-
ers' compensation. The worker would still receive immediate
relief and, at the same time, the employer's liability would be
limited to his liability under the workers' compensation sched-
ule. In addition, the burden of the accident would be placed on
the industry involved, the maintenance of a safe work environ-
ment would be encouraged, and the harmony of the workplace
would be preserved since the employee could not sue his
employer directly. Arguably, the employer would lose his quid
pro quo if he were impleaded as a party to an action between
the employee and third party. This, however, is a small burden
when compared with the encumbrance on the third party. With-
out an action for partial contribution, the third party must
shoulder the entire liability even though only partially at fault.
Furthermore, it can be argued that there is no a priori legiti-
macy to the quid pro quo bargain that was struck over sixty
years ago. The state imposed the bargain and can alter it in a
reasonable manner. Limited contribution is a reasonable revision
of the workers' compensation system because it maintains the
basic structure of the system yet allows the higher principle of
fair and equitable distribution of liability to preempt a small
portion of the employers' quid pro quo.
65. Washington has abolished the rule of active/passive indemnity. WAsH. REV.
CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1981). The drafters of this statute indicated in their committee
report that the all or nothing rule of implied indemnity conflicted with the underlying
principles of the Tort Reform Act and therefore should be abolished. REPORT, supra note
17, at 51, 1 Senate Journal 636, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981). Thus, Washington has made
unavailable a remedy that other courts have recognized as ameliorating the harshness of
the no contribution rule. See Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 ll1.2d
1, 11-12, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442 (1977) (recognizing that the active/passive theory of indem-
nity was designed to mitigate the harshness of no contribution).
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IV. MINORITY VIEW ALLOWING CONTRIBUTION
A minority of courts hold that neither the exclusive remedy
provision of the applicable state workers' compensation act, nor
the term jointly and severally liable found in the applicable state
contribution law, precludes an action by a third party tortfeasor
against an employer for contribution.6 Basically, these decisions
determine that fairness requires losses to be distributed among
all parties at fault,67 and that the legislature in granting the
employer immunity from common law suits did not mean to do
so at the expense of the third party." The primary policy argu-
ment for contribution is that while both the employer and
employee receive a quid pro quo for their participation in work-
ers' compensation, the third party is not part of this compro-
mise. Therefore, the Act should not encompass or limit the
rights of the third party against the employer.09 Proponents of
contribution argue that it would be unfair to include the third
party within the principle of mutual sacrifice when his part is to
be all sacrifice and no corresponding gain. 0
Courts allowing contribution also emphasize that there is no
valid reason for the continued existence of the no contribution
rule and present many compelling arguments against it. As Dean
Prosser expressed it:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which per-
mits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were
equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered on to one
alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execu-
tion, the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiff's whim or
spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer while the latter
goes free.71
A rule of no contribution allows the fortuity of a joint tortfeasor
being an employer to undermine the principle of equitable dis-
66. Annot., 100 A.L.R. 3d 350, 362-64 (1980).
67. See Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 151, 282 N.E.2d 288, 294, 331
N.Y.S.2d 382, 390 (1972).
68. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 129, 257 N.W.2d at 689.
69. Id.
70. Id. See also Lunderberg v. Bierman, 241 Minn. 349, 363-65, 63 N.W.2d 355, 365
(1954) (the Workmen's Compensation Act does not encompass or limit rights of third
parties against employers nor should it).
71. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 307 (4th ed. 1971), quoted in
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 374 N.E.2d 437, 442,
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
[Vol. 6:343
Third Party's Contribution Rights
tribution of losses. Such a rule lacks sense and justice when
there are alternatives available.
Tort systems that adopt either comparative fault or the rule
of joint and several liability create a potential for harsh results
when contribution is denied. For example, Washington's new
Tort Reform Statute abolishes active/passive negligence,7" which
depletes the remedies available to a court for reducing the
harshness of the no contribution rule. 3 In addition, the Tort
Reform Act codifies the rule of joint and several liability.7 Thus,
when independent yet concurrent negligence contributes to a
single injury, the injured party can receive full recovery from
any single tortfeasor. The Senate Select Committee on Tort and
Product Liability Reform found that this rule was unfair since it
would require a partially at fault defendant to pay more than his
share of the joint defendant's liability in certain cases. The
Committee determined, however, that the unfairness should be
ameliorated by the creation of the right of contribution.78 If the
employer is held immune from contribution, the legislature's
evident intent is frustrated because the right of contribution
cannot be used to prevent the harshness of the joint and several
liability rule.
Proponents of contribution also assert that due process may
be violated when the third party tortfeasor's right to contribu-
tion or indemnity is extinguished by the workers' compensation
laws without providing him a reasonable substitute for his right.
Although this argument appears tenuous, a Minnesota statute
expressly codifying the employer's immunity from contribution
was held unconstitutional. 71 Other courts, however, have consis-
tently upheld the constitutionality of the workers' compensation
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1981).
73. See supra note 57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of active/
passive indemnity in an action between an employer and third party.
74. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.030 (1981). For text of statute, see supra note 29.
75. REPORT, supra note 17, at 23, 1 Senate Journal 627-28, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess.
(1981).
76. Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974). The provision in the
Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act, found unconstitutional, states:
If an action as provided in this chapter prosecuted by an employee, the
employer or both jointly against the third person, or settlement by such third
person, the employer shall have no liability to reimburse or hold such person
harmless on such judgments or settlements in absence of a written agreement
to do so executed prior to injury.
MINN. STAT. § 176.061(10), repealed by 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 2, § 7, ch. 154, § 3.
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scheme when it bars third party actions against the employer."
The thrust of the minority view is recognition of the need
for fairness to the third party as well as to the employer. The
essence of a third party's interest is that of any other co-
tortfeasor: to limit his liability to no more than his established
fault.78 This principle, and other policies supporting contribu-
tion, have led to three approaches for resolving the employer
contribution issue. The first approach allows full contribution. 9
Although said to be premised on fundamental fairness, this rule
shifts the burden from one system to the other by deferring to
the policies supporting contribution and failing to adequately
consider the policies underlying workers' compensation. The sec-
ond approach reduces the judgment either by one-half or by the
percentage of the employer's concurring negligence.80 Both of
these approaches unacceptably impair the plaintiff's right to full
recovery. The third approach allows limited contribution." This
rule rests on a balanced prioritization of the many policies sup-
porting each system, and most equitably resolves the contribu-
tion issue.
A. Full Contribution
Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.82 illustrates the rule of full con-
tribution. The Dole court resolved the policy conflict by holding
that the deciding factor is fairness.8 " The court indicated that as
long as the present tort system continues, an effective contribu-
tion and indemnity scheme is necessary to handle the growing
problems created by multiple tort liability. After reasoning that
the rule of no contribution conflicted with tort policy goals of
deterrence, equitable loss sharing by all wrongdoers, and effec-
77. See, e.g., Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 290 N.W.2d 276
(1980). The Wisconsin court held, "[wle are satisfied that the classification which the
legislature has made is reasonable and that it is not constitutionally inappropriate to
make employers a favored class where claims of contribution are asserted in third party
actions." Id. at 188-89, 290 N.W.2d at 284.
78. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 122, 257 N.W.2d at 685.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 82-89.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 90-104.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 105-11 for a discussion of the limited contri-
bution rule.
82. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See also Dibernardo v.
Heimroth, 72 A.D.2d 633, 421 N.Y.S.2d 149 (1979); Nelson v. Dykes Lumber Co., 52 A.D.
2d 808, 383 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1976).
83. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 151, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
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tive distribution over a large segment of society,8 the court
solved the problem of joint liability by evaluating the third
party's cause of action. It found that the third party does not
sue for damages on account of the injury to the employee but
rather asserts his own recovery for breach of an alleged indepen-
dent duty or obligation owed to him by the employer.8 5
The Dole opinion contains two major flaws. First, although
the court adequately explored the policies supporting contribu-
tion, it failed to consider the policies underlying workers' com-
pensation." In ignoring the workers' compensation policies, the
court adopted a rule that abrogates entirely the quid pro quo of
limited liability that an employer expects when he pays workers'
compensation premiums, simply because a third party happens
to be partially at fault in the workplace. Second, the conclusion
that the employer owed an independent obligation to the third
party lacks adequate support because the court relied on a case
in which the employer was obligated to indemnify a third
party.8 Supporting its decision with an indemnity case obscured
the distinction between indemnity and contribution. Indemnity
implies a contract, agreement, or obligation between the
employer and third party, requiring the employer to respond for
all damages. 88 Thus the employer must manifest his intention,
impliedly or in writing, to bear the burden in order for a third
party to seek indemnity. Contribution, on the other hand,
requires no prior obligation or agreement, but distributes a com-
mon burden amongst wrongdoers based upon equity and good
conscience.8 9 A legal requirement of contribution should not be
confused with an independently acquired obligation between the
84. Id. at 150, 282 N.E.2d at 293, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 389.
85. Id. at 152, 282 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
86. In their discussion of the issue, the New York court did mention New York's
workers' compensation act, N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAw § 11 (McKinney 1965). However, the
policies underlying the law were not discussed. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 282 N.E.2d at
294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
87. Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 152, 288 N.E.2d at 294, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 390, citing Westches-
ter Light Co. v. Westchester County Small Estate Corp., 278 N.Y. 175, 15 N.E.2d 567
(1938).
88. The difference between indemnity and contribution-in cases between per-
sons liable for a wrong-is that in the former the law implies an agreement or
obligation and enforces a duty on the primary or principle wrongdoer to
respond for all damages, whereas in contribution, there is no agreement
express or implied but a common burden in which the parties stand in equali
juri [sic] and which in equity and good conscience should be equally borne.
American District Telegraph Co. v. Kittleson, 179 F.2d 946, 951 (8th Cir. 1950).
89. Id.
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third party and the employer. The Dole court's inability to make
the distinction between indemnity and contribution illustrates
its lack of analysis of the underlying conflict. Although the Dole
rule of apportionment based on fault alone appears fair at first
glance, the competing interests of the tort and workers' compen-
sation systems require a more balanced approach.
B. Reduction in Judgment
The second minority approach, which calls for a reduction
of the judgment against the third party when the employer is
partially at fault, was adopted by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in Murray v. United States.90 Following
the majority view that there is no joint liability between the
employer and the third party defendant sued in tort, the court
found no right of contribution.91 The court, noting the inequities
of the no contribution rule, mitigated its harshness by reducing
the judgment against the third party by one-half.92 The court
viewed the employer as a settling tortfeasor and the employee's
receipt of compensation constituted a sale of one-half his
claim."' Critics of Murray contend that the rule destroys the
concept of apportioning liability on the basis of fault." It
imposes an arbitrary fifty percent reduction of the employee's
judgment,95 and shifts the loss from the third party to the inno-
cent injured employee, 9e eliminating the employee's right to a
full recovery.9 7
90. 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
91. Id. at 1364.
92. Id. at 1365.
93. The court, citing Martello v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1962), held
that when one joint tortfeasor compromises his claim, the other tortfeasor, although not
able to seek contribution because the settling tortfeasor has bought his peace, is none-
theless protected by having his liability reduced by one-half on the theory that one-half
of the claim was sold by the victim when he executed the settlement. Kittleson, 405 F.2d
at 1361.
94. A. LARSON, supra note 41, at 14-314 to -319; Comment, The Effect of Workers'
Compensation Laws on the Right of a Third Party Liable to an Injured Employer to
Recover Contribution or Indemnity From the Employer, 9 SErON HALL 238, 283 (1978).
95. Comment, The Effect of Workers' Compensation Laws on the Right of a Third
Party Liable to an Injured Employer to Recover Contribution or Indemnity From an
Employer, 9 SETON HALL 238, 283 (1978).
96. Id. at 284.
97. It is unlikely that the Murray Rule could ever be adopted in a jurisdiction such
as Washington where the legislature has codified the rule of joint and several liability.
WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.030 (1981).
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Sheilman v. United States Lines, Inc.,'5 offers a different
solution. In a memorandum opinion, the judge reduced the
plaintiff's recovery by the percentage of his contributory negli-
gence plus the percentage of the employer's concurring negli-
gence.1 On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that the
rule imposed unjustified burdens upon the injured employee and
restricted his right to full recovery. 100 Unlike Murray, the
"Shellman Rule" has some logic. It comports with the tort and
workers' compensation systems since it limits the third party's
payments to no more than his established fault, and it preserves
the workers' compensation act as the sole determinant of the
employer's liability.' Arguably, the rule is also fair to the
employee. The employee still receives workers' compensation in
lieu of any common law remedy for the employer's negligence,
just as if a third party were not involved. And by reducing the
employee's judgment, the rule eliminates the problem of double
recovery. Nevertheless, the "Shellman Rule" fails because it
abrogates the doctrine of joint and several liability intended to
ensure the injured plaintiff's full recovery. 10 2 Because the corner-
stone of tort law is the assurance of full compensation to the
injured party, 03 treating tortfeasors more fairly should not
result in decreasing the chances of full recovery by innocent
injured plaintiffs.1 0 4 Although the "Shellman Rule" is a viable
answer to the conflict between employer and third party inter-
98. 528 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1975).
99. Id. at 676.
100. Id. at 680.
101. See Brief of Amicus Curiae at 5, Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 88,
652 P.2d 948 (1982).
102. The "Shelman Rule" destroys joint and several liability because it prevents
the injured employee from receiving judgment for the full amount of his injuries from
one tortfeasor. The premise behind joint and several liability is the easing of the injured
party's burden by allowing him to require one of several tortfeasors to pay the full judg-
ment. The tortfeasors then battle among each other to determine the apportionment of
fault.
103. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d 230, 236, 588
P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (1980).
104. Note, Contribution Among Tortfeasors in Washington: The 1981 Tort Reform
Act, 57 WASH. L. REv. 479, 488 (1982).
An additional argument can be advanced that the disparity between the injured
worker's recovery at common law and the amount of compensation he receives under
workers' compensation forces an employee to sue a third party in order to receive suffi-
cient funds to compensate him for his injuries. Therefore, it is important to allow full
recovery from the third party or the employee will have to seek support from other social
agencies.
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ests, it places a heavy burden on an injured plaintiff, and thus
fails to be the most equitable solution.
C. Limited Contribution
The third minority approach is the most equitable rule
because it considers and balances the interests of the third
party, employer, and employee. This view concludes that contri-
bution should be allowed in an amount equal to the employer's
fault yet not to exceed the employer's total workers' compensa-
tion liability to the injured worker. 10 5 The Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted this approach in Lambertson v. Cincinnati
Corp.06 In reaching its decision, the Lambertson court discussed
the relevant policies and interests at length. 0 7 The court found
that imposing full contribution on the employer thwarts the cen-
tral concepts of the workers' compensation system, and no con-
tribution causes the third party to bear the burden of a full com-
mon law judgment despite the employer's possibly greater
fault.108 Limited contribution, on the other hand, keeps the
workers' compensation system intact, mitigates the burden
placed on the third party, and solves any problem of double
recovery.109
In addition to its policy analysis, the court supported its
conclusion with legal arguments. The court reasoned that while
there is no joint liability to the employee in tort, both the
employer and third party are nonetheless liable to the employee
for his injuries: the employer through the fixed no-fault workers'
compensation and the third party through the variable recovery
available in a common law tort action.110 The court also found
that the exclusive remedy provision is not an absolute bar to
contribution because it was intended to control only the rights
between employer and employee. 1 ' Through reasoned analysis,
105. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 130, 257 N.W.2d 679 at 689. See also Maio v. Fabs,
339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105 (1940).
106. 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 679 (1977); followed in Bjerk v. Universal Eng'g
Corp., 552 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Raske Bldg. Sys., Inc., 276 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. 1979); Bigham v. J.C. Penney Co., 268 N.W.2d 892 (Minn. 1978).
107. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 119-30, 257 N.W.2d at 684-89.
108. Id. at 120, 257 N.W.2d at 684.
109. For a discussion of the double recovery problem, see Beach v. M & N Modern
Hydraulic Press Co., 428 F. Supp. 956 (D. Kan. 1977); Schweizer v. Elox Div. of Colt
Indus., 133 N.J. Super. 297, 336 A.2d 73 (1975); supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
110. Lambertson, 312 Minn. at 128, 257 N.W.2d at 688.
111. Id.
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the Lambertson court developed alternatives to the narrow
interpretation offered by other courts, taking a more balanced
approach to the contribution conflict.
The Lambertson limited contribution rule provides an equi-
table formula distributing the costs between the workers' com-
pensation and tort systems. When an employee recovers from a
third party prior to receiving workers' compensation benefits,
the third party will pay the full judgment and have a right of
contribution against the employer in an amount proportional to
the employer's percentage of fault but not in excess of the
employer's total workers' compensation liability to plaintiff.
When the employee sues the third party subsequent to receiving
benefits, the judgment against the third party will be reduced by
an amount proportional to the employer's percentage of fault or
the amount of benefits, whichever is less. The employer will be
entitled to a lien on plaintiff's recovery when the value of the
employer's percentage of fault is less than the value of benefits
paid. Arguably, this rule will force the employer to defend on
the issue of fault and thus incur litigation expenses, which
thwarts part of the employer's quid pro quo. This burden on the
employer, however, is justified because, in balancing the inter-
ests, the principle of fair apportionment of fault supersedes this
portion of his quid pro quo. Furthermore, the employer always
has the opportunity to settle with the third party or merely pay
the amount owed under workers' compensation, an amount that
would have been paid anyway but for the fortuity of a third
party's act. In addition, the artificial limit on the employer's
contribution forces the joint tortfeasor to compensate the
employee in excess of the joint tortfeasor's proportional fault
even though the employer is brought into the action. Because
the limited contribution rule takes into account the perspectives
of all interested parties and the policies of the two partially
overlapping statutory systems, it is the most equitable solution
to the issue of contribution from employers.
V. REFORM OF WASHINGTON'S LAW
The Washington Supreme Court has adopted the majority
rule of no contribution.1 1 2 Denial of contribution unjustifiably
burdens a third party who receives no advantages or benefits
112. Glass. 97 Wash. 2d 880. 652 P.2d 948 (1982).
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from the workers' compensation system. It also lessens the
employer's costs for accidents that might be avoided by the
employer, which thwarts the safety objective of the workers'
compensation system and increases the accident prevention
costs of the third party. Changing Washington's rule of no con-
tribution to a rule of limited contribution will equitably balance
the interests of all parties:113 (1) the employer's interest in his
quid pro quo of limited liability and sustained integrity of the
workers' compensation system, (2) the third party's interest in
limiting his liability to his percentage of fault, (3) the plaintiff's
interest in full recovery and joint and several liability, (4) the
state's interest in maintaining the financial stability of the acci-
dent fund.
If these interests and policies had been considered by the
Washington Supreme Court in Glass, the judiciary could have
changed the rule of no contribution. When two statutes overlap,
as the contribution and employer immunity statutes do, the
court has the duty to give each its maximum effect, especially
when a compromise will not unduly burden either system."' As
the Illinois Supreme Court pointed out: "Where this court has
created a rule or doctrine which, under present conditions, we
consider unsound and unjust, we have not only power, but the
duty, to modify or abolish it."" 5 Arguably, the Washington judi-
ciary did create the rule of no contribution from an employer," 6
and clearly it is unjust."' By construing the exclusivity clause to
apply only to those individuals who benefit from the Industrial
Insurance Act, the court could have allowed limited contribution
113. This note does not directly address the impact of limited contribution on self-
insurers. See supra note 7. However, it is assumed that the same changes should be
made with regard to the self-insurer. The changes would in fact be simpler because the
state's interest in the fund's financial stability is not implicated. Furthermore, the in-
equities are even more persuasive because a self-insured employer is now given the abil-
ity to pass on the cost of his negligence to a third party.
114. "It is the duty of the court to reconcile apparently conflicting statutes and to
give effect to each of them, if this can be achieved without distortion of the language
used." State v. Fagalde, 85 Wash. 2d 730, 736, 539 P.2d 86, 90 (1975).
115. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 II. 2d 1, 13, 374 N.E. 2d
437, 442, cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
116. Although the Industrial Insurance Act does preclude an employee's suit against
his employer, it was the court that extended the employer's immunity to include suits
brought by third parties. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Shoreline Concrete Co., 91 Wash. 2d
230, 588 P.2d 1308 (1978).
117. In Glass, the supreme court stated that "requiring one wrongdoer to shoulder
all the damages when the other wrongdoer is an employer may be unfair." 97 Wash. 2d
at 888, 652 P.2d at 953.
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and thus modified an unfair rule.
The failure of the Washington Supreme Court to recognize
and balance the policy objectives of both workers' compensation
and the Tort Reform Act devolves the responsibility to the legis-
lature. To properly order these policies, the legislature should
amend Washington's Industrial Insurance Act to accomplish the
following:
(1) When an injured worker seeks recovery from a third
party subsequent to being compensated from the Industrial
Insurance Fund, the judgment should be diminished by the per-
centage of the employer's fault, but not in excess of the total
amount of compensation." l
(2) When the injured worker sues a third party prior to
receiving compensation or has additional compensation due him,
the third party should pay the judgment in full and be assigned
the worker's rights to compensation. This assigned right will
allow the third party to receive contribution from the state fund
according to the employer's percentage of fault or the amount
owed to the worker under the compensation schedule, whichever
is less. 119
(3) When the third party is allowed contribution from the
state fund because of employer fault, that cost must be figured
into the employer's premiums, thus compensating for the
insurer's lack of lien or subrogation rights against the employee's
recovery from a third party. 2 '
118. For example, if an injured worker loses a leg above the knee, the worker is
entitled to $36,000 in workers' compensation benefits. WASH. REV. CODE § 51.32.080
(1981). Suppose, after receiving benefits, this employee brings a tort action against a
third party and wins a judgment for $100,000. If at trial the jury found the employer
50% negligent and the third party 50% negligent, the limited contribution model would
require that the judgment against the third party be diminished by $36,000 because the
amount received in benefits was less than the amount of the judgment for which the
employer is responsible by fault. If, however, the employer had been adjudged only 10%
negligent and the third party 90% negligent, the judgment would be diminished by only
$10,000.
119. For example, in rare situations the employee may sue the third party prior to
receiving workers' compensation benefits. If the employee wins a judgment for $100,000,
joint and several liability requires the third party to pay the employee the full $100,000.
Under the limited contribution model, the third party would then have a right to collect
from the state fund the amount of workers' compensation benefits that the worker would
have received. Using the example in footnote 118, the third party could collect $36,000 if
the employer was 50% at fault or $10,000 if the employer was only 10% at fault.
120. The limited contribution rule would limit the department's lien and subroga-
tion rights. According to the testimony of the staff of the Department of Labor and
Industries, this could cost the department over $2,000,000 per year. Product Liability
1983]
368 University of Puget Sound Law Review
These changes, expressly incorporating limited contribution
into the Industrial Insurance Act, would preserve the basic poli-
cies of the workers' compensation and tort systems. The limited
contribution rule maintains joint and several liability, furthers
the plaintiff's interest in full recovery, and therefore is prefera-
ble to the "Shellman Rule."'12 A rule of limited contribution also
prevents plaintiff's double recovery. 22 Even though the distribu-
tion of losses is not a total apportionment on the basis of fault,
because of the overlap with the employer's limited liability, the
essence of the principles of fairness and comparative fault are
preserved. The rule also prevents workplace injuries from play-
ing a significant role in the rising costs of product liability insur-
ance. 12  Hence, although limited contribution is not a totally
equitable distribution of costs, it does promote tort concepts of
comparative fault to the greatest extent possible while still
maintaining the integrity of the workers' compensation system.
The rule of limited contribution maintains the basic struc-
ture of the workers' compensation system by limiting the
employer's liability to the extent of his insurance coverage.
Although the rule may burden the employer with additional
involvement in litigation, this burden must be borne because, in
reconciling the overlap between the systems, the principles of
fairness and fault should be given priority over this part of the
employer's quid pro quo. Putting a ceiling on the employer's
potential liability fairly compromises both his interest and the
third party's interest.
In addition, the rule benefits the workers' compensation sys-
tem by rewarding and encouraging safety. Under the current
system, the state fund can recoup losses through its lien and
and Workplace Injury: Hearing before the Washington State Senate Select Committee
on Product Liability, June 17, 1980 (testimony of Virginia Bins, Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral). These losses, however, could be recouped by readjusting the premium base rates
for all classes. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 296-17-895 (1980); telephone interview with
Tim Wisecarver, Department of Labor and Industries (Jan. 28, 1982) (on file with the
University of Puget Sound Law Review).
121. For a discussion of the benefits of the "Shellman rule" see supra notes 86-88
and accompanying text.
122. Double recovery is currently prevented in Washington by the insurer's lien and
subrogation rights. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 51.24.050, 51.24.060 (1981).
123. The drafters of the Tort Reform Act were concerned about product liability
insurance costs. Studies presented to the Senate Committee indicated that workplace
injuries account for 11% of the number of individuals receiving bodily injury payments
in product liability claims and the claims represent 42% of the claims dollars paid out.
REPORT. supra note 17. at 9, 1 Senate Journal 621, Reg. & 1st Ex. Sess. (1981).
[Vol. 6:343
Third Party's Contribution Rights
subrogation rights. The cost of the accident is not used in calcu-
lating the employer's premium even though the employer may
have been partially at fault.124 This calculation method contra-
venes the principle that the industry should bear the cost of
industrial accidents, and discourages safety precautions. In his
concurring opinion in Glass, Justice Rosellini pointed out that
when an injured employee is paid by a third party manufacturer,
the employer's time loss experience would not be increased.
12 5
The Industrial Insurance Act provides that if any compensation
is received by an employee from a third party, reimbursement
must be made to the Department of Labor and Industries. Once
this reimbursement is received, the cost of the accident is not
applied to the employer's premiums. 12 6 The employer, under
these circumstances, is not deterred from using unsafe machines,
as he would expect the machine's manufacturer to compensate
the worker for his injuries. 1 7 Allowing limited contribution
forces the employer to be safety conscious because he knows
that his premiums will rise if he is not.
Inclusion of accidents involving third parties in the calcula-
tion of premiums also preserves the financial stability of the
accident fund. Under the proposed changes, the state would no
longer have a lien against the employee's recovery from a third
party. If contribution were allowed, the state would potentially
lose an average $2,000,000 a year.1 2' The changes would prevent
this loss by increasing the employer's base rate and including
the loss in the employer's experience rating.12 9 The current sys-
124. See Boeing Aircraft Co. v. Department of Labor & Indus., 22 Wash. 2d 423,
434, 156 P.2d 640, 645 (1945).
125. Glass, 97 Wash. 2d at 891, 652 P.2d at 954 (Rosellini, J., concurring).
126. Id.
127. Id. Justice Rosellini feared results similar to Davis v. Niagara Mach. Co., 90
Wash. 2d 342, 581 P.2d 1344 (1978). In Davis, the court refused to allow contribution
even though the employer had purposefully refrained from installing warning tags on the
machine that caused the injury.
128. Product Liability and Workplace Injury: Hearing before the Washington
State Senate Select Committee on Product Liability, June 27, 1980 (testimony of Vir-
ginia Bins, Assistant Attorney General).
129. The Industrial Insurance Manual provides a base rate for each class of employ-
ers. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 296-17-895 (1982). These rates establish the minimum pre-
mium for each class. The individual employer's premium is determined by adding his
experience rating to this base rate. WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 296-17-850 (1982). To recoup
losses from the lack of a lien against third party judgments, the base rate for each class
would need to be increased. To provide safety incentives, the employer's total loss expo-
sure, including losses incurred because of limited contribution, would need to be used in
calculating his experience rating.
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tern forces a third party to pay the costs of workers' compensa-
tion while receiving none of its benefits. Increasing the
employer's premiums forces the industry "to bear the burden of
the costs arising out of industrial injuries.."130
VI. CONCLUSION
The question of contribution is not a new one. Equitable
resolution of the inherent tensions between the overlapping sys-
tems, however, seems to have eluded most jurisdictions. Profes-
sor Larson suggests that the issue is one of the most evenly bal-
anced controversies in all of compensation law."' This as-
sumption, however, should not prevent a solution. The no con-
tribution rule adopted in a majority of jurisdictions fails to give
full consideration to the policies and interests underlying the
tort system. The minority approach allowing full contribution
unduly burdens the workers' compensation system. Reconciling
the two systems requires adoption of a rule of limited contribu-
tion which recognizes the basic tenets of both systems, thus pre-
serving their integrity while striking the most equitable balance
possible.
Karin Nyrop
130. Jussila v. Department of Labor & Indus., 59 Wash. 2d 772, 779, 370 P.2d 582,
586 (1962).
131. A. LARSON, supra note 41, at § 76.
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